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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vance Watkins was charged with a single count of lewd conduct with a minor. 
His case originally went to trial in 2005 and he was found guilty by the jury; however, his 
conviction and sentence were eventually vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court and his 
case was remanded for a new trial. 
In 2010, Mr. Watkins' case went to trial for a second time. During the retrial, 
despite a stipulation that no mention be made of the first trial, one of the State's 
witnesses revealed to the jury that, not only had there been a previous trial, but also an 
appeal. Based on this testimony, which Mr. Watkins argued was tantamount to 
informing the jury that he had previously been convicted, Mr. Watkins moved for a 
mistrial. That motion, however, was denied by the district and, at the conclusion of the 
second trial, Mr. Watkins was again found guilty by the jury. 
Mr. Watkins appeals. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in 
denying his motion for a mistrial because the testimony informing the jury of ~1is 
previous conviction in this case denied him a fair trial. 
In response, the State argues that the district court did not err. It offers a number 
of arguments, procedural and substantive. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to point out the reasons why each and every one of 
the State's arguments fails. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were set forth in detail in 
Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial, made after a 
State's witness revealed that Mr. Watkins had an earlier trial and appeal in this case? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Watkins' Motion For A Mistrial, Made After A 
State's Witness Revealed That Mr. Watkins Had An Earlier Trial And Appeal In This 
Case 
A. Introduction 
When Officer Archuleta testified that Mr. Watkins had a previous trial and appeal 
in this case, the most reasonable inference for the jury to draw was that Mr. Watkins 
had previously been found guilty, but had his conviction overturned on appeal. Given 
the overwhelming prejudice attendant to such a disclosure to a lay jury, Mr. Watkins has 
argued that this testimony deprived him of a fair trial and, therefore, it was error for the 
district court to have denied his motion for a mistrial. 
In response, the State proffers three arguments. First, after mischaracterizing 
the applicable legal standard, the State seeks to have this Court rule against 
I\Jlr. Watkins for not having satisfied a non-existent standard. Second, the State sets up 
a "straw man" argument by mischaracterizing one of Mr. Watkins' arguments as a 
statement of "fact," then knocks down its "straw man" by pointing out that the district 
court concluded otherwise. Finally, based on its own interpretation of Officer 
Archuletta's testimony (construing that testimony as alerting the jury only to the fact of a 
prior trial, not a guilty verdict), the State argues that the district court was correct to have 
denied Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial. 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's present arguments are 
without merit. 
3 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The legal standards applicable to this case were set forth in IVlr. Watkins' 
Appellant's Brief. (pp.9-13.) The State does not outwardly challenge any of these 
standards and, in fact, explicitly agrees with some of them. For instance, the State 
appears to concede that revealing that a defendant has previously been found guilty by 
a jury in the same case is so prejudicial as to require a mistrial. ( See Respondent's 
Brief, pp.9-11.) Also, the State concedes that the standard of review of a denial of a 
motion for a mistrial, although described as an "abuse of discretion" standard, "is one of 
reversible error." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) 
However, the State then goes on to argue that, because a "curative instruction" 
was given following Officer Archuletta's improper testimony, it is Mr. Watkins' burden to 
"show[] that 'there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury [was] unable to follow 
the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the [testimony] [was] 
"devastating" to"' to him. (Respondent's Brief, p.7 (quoting State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 
631 (Ct. App. 2004)).) This is not correct. As was set forth in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's 
Brief (p.13), the standard is simply one of reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Shepherd, 
124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App.1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. 
App.1983)). 1 
The standard urged by the State in t~1is case is derived from dicta in a footnote in 
a sharply-divided United States Supreme Court opinion.2 See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 
1 Lest there be any lingering doubt as to whether the Shepherd/Urquhart "reversible 
error" standard is controlling in Idaho, it should be observed that the Idaho Supreme 
Court explicitly adopted this standard in State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007). 
2 Although there were only three dissenters in Greer, Justice Stevens, who concurred 
with the five-justice majority, concurred on procedural grounds and, in writing 
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756, 766 n.8 (1987). 3 It is not binding on the states because it was not part of the 
Court's due process analysis in that case, see id. at 766, and it is not particularly 
persuasive because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no analogue to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1.4 Thus, it is not surprising that, in reviewing district court 
denials of defense motions for mistrials in instances where "curative instructions" were 
given, the Idaho Supreme Court has never embraced (or even acknowledged) this 
standard. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670 (2010) (making no mention 
separately, made it clear that, on the substantive question, he agreed with the three 
dissenting justices. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
3 In Greer, the United States Supreme Court evaluated a situation where the 
prosecutor, in cross-examining the defendant, asked the defendant about his post-
arrest silence in an effort to have the jury infer the defendant's guilt from his silence. 
See Greer, 483 U.S. at 759. The Court held that the prosecutor's question did not 
constitute a due process violation akin to that which was found in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610 (1976), see Greer, 483 U.S. at 761-65, and that, although the prosecutor's 
action in asking an inappropriate question constituted misconduct, under the facts of the 
case, it was not prejudicial as to constitute a due process violation. In reaching this 
latter conclusion, the Court found it significant that the misconduct consisted of a single 
question, which was never answered, and which elicited an immediate objection, which 
was sustained, leading to two curative instructions. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-67. (As 
discussed in note 2, supra, four justices-three dissenting justices and one concurring 
justice-disagreed with the majority on this point.) With regard to the curative 
instruction, the Supreme Court dropped a lengthy footnote, the second paragraph of 
which began as follows: 
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard 
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an 
"overwhelming probability" that the jury will be unable to follow the court's 
instructions, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S. Ct. 1702, _, 
95 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1987), and a strong likelihood that the effect of the 
evidence would be "devastating" to the defendant, Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123, 136, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1628, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968) .... 
Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8. Of course, this standard, cobbled together from other cases 
for the first time in Greer, would not have actually applied in Greer because the issue in 
that case did not involve inadmissible "evidence" because the prosecutor's improper 
question was not "evidence," and because, even if the prosecutor's improper question 
was "evidence," it was intentionally, not inadvertently, presented. 
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of Greer, recognizing that "a limiting instruction alone cannot always prevent an error 
from prejudicing the defendant," and vacating a lewd conduct conviction based on the 
erroneous admission of "prior bad act" evidence even though the jury was instructed not 
to consider the "bad act" evidence as probative of the defendant's guilt); Van Brunt v. 
Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 686-87 (2001) (making no mention of Greer or the above-
quoted standard in evaluating a claim of error revolving around the district court's 
decision to give a curative instruction instead of declaring a mistrial when a witness 
misspoke and gave inappropriate testimony). 
Nevertheless, in 2004, the Idaho Court of Appeals employed the reasoning of 
footnote 8 in Greer in affirming a district court decision denying a defendant's motion for 
a mistrial when a government witness (a police detective) blurted out information 
prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630-31 (Ct. App. 2004). It 
held as follows: 
A mistrial may be granted only where there is an "error or legal 
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside of the courtroom, 
which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial." I.C.R. 29.1. The admission of improper evidence does not 
automatically require the declaration of a mistrial. Where improper 
testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly 
instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is ordinarily presumed that 
the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely. No less an authority than 
the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed: 
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to 
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to 
it, unless there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury 
will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong 
likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 
"devastating" to the defendant. 
4 The Federal Rules do contain a Rule relating to mistrials; however that Rule simply 
requires that, before declaring a mistrial, the federal court must hear input from both 
parties. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.3. 
6 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8 .... 
The court here instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's 
question, and the prosecutor's disclosure to the jury that Hill had been in 
jail could hardly be characterized as "devastating." Given that Hill was on 
trial for a criminal offense, even in the absence of the prosecutor's 
question, any reasonably knowledgeable juror likely would have surmised 
that Hill had at some point been in jail. Hill has not demonstrated that she 
was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not 
err in denying her motion for a mistrial. 
Hill, 140 Idaho at 631 (some citations omitted). In Hill, however, the Court of Appeals 
made no attempt to explain how this new standard from Greer ought to be reconciled 
with the accepted "reversible error" standard. 
Since 2004, the Court of Appeals has discussed the Greer/Hill standard twice 
more. In 2008, in State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490 (Ct. App. 2008), the Court of 
Appeals employed that standard in affirming a district court denial of a defense motion 
for a mistrial when a government witness (again, a police detective) gave arguably 
inadmissible testimony which the State had stipulated that it would not present; 
however, in doing so, the Court of Appeals recognized that in State v. Martinez, 136 
Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2001 ), it had articulated a different, far less onerous standard 
concerning the question of how a "curative instruction" impacts a defendant's appellate 
claim that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. 5 Grantham, 146 
Idaho at 497-99 & n.1. In so doing, although the Grantham Court evidenced a 
preference for the ~1igher Greer/Hill standard, it did not explicitly reject the lower 
5 The competing standard, set forth in State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2001 ), 
does not speak in terms of an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to 
follow the "curative instruction" and a "strong likelihood" that the improper testimony was 
"devastating" to the defendant; it requires only that "it is likely that the adverse effect of 
the improper testimony might not be eradicated by the instruction." Martinez, 136 Idaho 
at 526 (emphasis added). 
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standard and, thus, left open the question of which standard is required under Idaho 
law.6 See id. at 498 n.1. 
Earlier this year, the Court of Appeals revisited the Greer/Hill standard in State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2011 ). In that case, although the Court again 
acknowledged the Greer/Hill standard, 7 it recognized that, read strictly, the Greer/Hill 
standard would be distinct from the "reversible error" standard that has long been 
applied to claims of error involving a failure to grant a defense motion for a mistrial. 
Thus, the Norton Court attempted to reconcile the two standards and, in doing so, made 
it clear that satisfaction of the discreet elements of the Greer/Hill standard is not a strict 
requirement for a defendant appealing the district court's decision to deny his motion for 
a mistrial. It explained as follows: 
The parties argue over what standard should be applied to a 
motion for a mistrial, with Norton arguing the standard harmless error test 
set forth in Urquhart, and the State arguing the language from Grantham 
with respect to whether there is an overwhelming probability that the jury 
was unable to follow the court's instruction. Grantham did not attempt to 
change the standard; rather, it makes clear that where a court gives a 
curative instruction, the appellate court may consider that factor in 
determining whether the alleged error is reversible. 
Norton, 254 P.3d at 94 (emphasis added).8 
6 Notably, in balding asserting that the Greer/Hill standard is the law in Idaho, the State 
has failed to cite to Grantham or Martinez, or otherwise recognize the existence of a 
competing standard. 
7 Although the Norton Court relied on Grantham, it did not discuss the far-less-onerous 
standard that had been articulated in Martinez and mentioned in Grantham. See 
Norton, 254 P.3d at 94. 
8 Although the State cites Norton in its briefing, it incorrectly suggests that Norton 
supports its position that Mr. Watkins has an affirmative obligation to prove that there is 
an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to disregard Officer Archuletta's 
improper statements, and that there is a "strong likelihood" that those statements were 
"devastating" to his defense. (See Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Nowhere in its brief does 
the State recognize that in Norton the Court of Appeals significantly curtailed the 
applicability of the Greer/Hill standard. (See generally Respondent's Brief.) 
8 
With this clarification by the Norton Court, and in light of the truism that it is the 
State's burden to show that an error occurring in a criminal case was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt, State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.2d 961, 973 (2010), it 
simply cannot be that Mr. Watkins had an affirmative obligation in this appeal to prove 
that there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to disregard Officer 
Archuleta's improper statements, and that there is a "strong likelihood" that those 
statements were "devastating" to his defense. Accordingly, the State's attempt to 
impose this burden on Mr. Watkins is meritless. 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Watkins' Motion For A Mistrial 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Watkins argued that Officer Archuleta's statements 
about Mr. Watkins' previous trial and appeal likely led the jurors to the correct 
conclusion that he had previously been found guilty by a different jury, only to have his 
conviction overturned on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) He then argued that 
presentation of this information to the jury was so improper and so highly prejudicial that 
it deprived him of a fair trial and, thus, warranted a mistrial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-
16.) 
As noted above, the State offers three arguments in response. First, after 
mischaracterizing the applicable legal standard, the State seeks to have this Court rule 
against Mr. Watkins for not having satisfied a non-existent standard. Second, the State 
sets up a "straw man" argument by mischaracterizing one of Mr. Watkins' arguments as 
a statement of "fact," then knocks down its "straw man" by pointing out that the district 
court concluded otherwise. Finally, based on its own interpretation of Officer 
Archuletta's testimony (construing that testimony as alerting the jury only to the fact of a 
9 
prior trial, not a guilty verdict), the State argues that the district court was correct to have 
denied Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial. 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's arguments are without merit. 
1. Mr. Watkins' Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted, Or Otherwise Deficient, 
For Failing To Incorporate An Argument On A !\Jon-Existent Standard 
As noted, the State's arguments in this case begin with the assumption that, 
because the district court gave a "curative instruction" in response to Officer Archuleta's 
improper statements (instructing the jurors not to speculate as to the result of 
Mr. Watkins' first trial), it is now Mr. Watkins' burden to "show[ ] that 'there is an 
"overwhelming probability" that the jury [was] unable to follow the court's instructions, 
and a strong likelihood that the effect of the [statements] [was] "devastating" to"' to him. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State then goes on to argue that because Mr. "Watkins 
has failed to present authority or argument addressing [this] legal standard" and, 
instead, only argues the harmless error standard, "he has failed to meet his appellate 
burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the trial court." (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-
9.) This argument is frivolous. 
First, for the reasons set forth in Part B, supra, the standard argued by the State 
(the Greer/Hi/I standard) is not the applicable standard. Idaho law dictates that the 
controlling standard is the "reversible error" standard. And this is the precise standard 
that Mr. Watkins argued throughout his Appellant's Brief. (See generally Appellant's 
Brief.) 
Second, to the extent that the language of the Greer/Hi/I standard has any 
continued vitality, it can only be understood to describe one consideration in the larger 
10 
"reversible error" standard. See Norton, 254 P.3d at 94. And, since Mr. Watkins clearly 
argued the "reversible error" standard, he has undoubtedly met his burden, if any,9 of 
providing adequate argument and authority under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). 
Third, and somewhat ironically, in attempting to default Mr. Watkins for failing to 
present argument or authority, the State has failed to cite any authority in support of its 
own argument. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) As such, the State's argument 
cannot be considered on appeal. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A 
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking .... ") 10 ; 
I.AR. 35(b)(6). 
2. Mr. Watkins' Claim Is Not Undercut By Any "Fact"-Finding By The District 
Court 
The State's second argument for affirming the district court's denial of 
Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial is based on its belief that the district court found, as a 
factual matter, that the jury was not informed that Mr. Watkins was previously convicted 
on the same charge. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8, 9-10.) After characterizing the district 
court's conclusion in this regard as a "factual" finding, the State then goes on to argue 
that Mr. Watkins has failed to challenge this "factual" finding as clearly erroneous, and it 
9 As noted above, it is the State's burden to show that an error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt if it seeks to have the appellate court affirm a conviction despite the 
existence of error below; it is not the defendant-appellant's burden prove that an error 
was not harmless. 
10 Although Zichko dealt with an appellant's failure to provide authority or argument, it 
actually spoke in broader terms, couching its holding in terms of "a party" who fails to 
provide authority or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. And, indeed, this broader 
languqge makes infinite sense since the holding of Zichko was based on the appellant's 
failure to comply with I.AR. 35, which requires not only that the appellant's brief 
"contain the contentions of the appellant ... , the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, citations and parts of the transcript and record relied upon," I.AR. 35(a)(6), 
but also that the respondent's brief contain such things. I.AR. 35(b)(6). 
11 
asserts that the record would not support such an argument anyway. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.9-10.) 
The State's argument lacks merit. Because the district court's interpretation of 
Officer Archuleta's testimony was not a factual finding, but rather an objective 
evaluation of how that testimony was likely understood by the jury, is not entitled to 
deference on appeal. 11 The reality is that Officer Archuleta's testimony speaks for itself 
and this Court is as well equipped to determine what the jury in this case likely took 
away from that testimony as was the district court. In other words, the district court's 
interpretation of Officer Archuleta's testimony is no more a "fact" entitled to deference 
than is an interpretation of the meaning of a witness's comment on the defendant's 
silence or a prosecutor's misstatement of the defense theory. See, e.g., State v. 
Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 908-09 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding an improper 
mischaracterization of the defense theory by the prosecutor even though the district 
court had made no finding as to whether the prosecutor had mischaracterized the 
defense theory); State v. Poland, 116 Idaho 34, 36-37 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding an 
improper comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence even though the district court 
had made no finding as to whether the prosecutor and responding witness actually 
raised an inference of guilt through their dialogue concerning the defendant's silence). 
Indeed, this Court frequently finds itself in the position of having to evaluate the impact 
of certain evidence on the jurors. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 
11 As a reminder, Officer Archuleta testified as follows: "In my transcript from the-well, 
can I say that because I was told I can't talk about the prior trial. . . . I read the 
transcript of the prior trial after the appeals court .... " (No. 37906 Jun. 21 2010 Tr., 
p.88, L.13-p.89, L.1.) 
12 
(1993) (calling upon the appellate court to determine what effect, if any, a trial error had 
upon the jury's verdict). 
In light of the reality that the district court's conclusion that Officer Archuleta's did 
not inform the jury that Mr. Watkins was found guilty by a jury at his first trial was not a 
factual finding entitled to deference on appeal, Mr. Watkins submits that the State's 
argument on this point should be disregarded. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in 
his Appellant's Brief (p.14), he submits that this Court should find that Officer 
Archuleta's testimony did likely inform the jury of the results of the first trial. 
3. Turning To The Merits Of Mr. Watkins' Claim, It Is Clear That The District 
Court Erred In Denying His Motion For A Mistrial 
In its third argument, the State finally reaches the merits of Mr. Watkins' 
contention on appeal-that Officer Archuleta's testimony deprived him of a fair trial such 
that it was error to have denied his motion for a mistrial-and argues that Mr. Watkins 
failed to establish any error in this regard. ( See Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.) In 
presenting this argument, however, the State relies on the premise of its second 
argument-that Officer Archuleta's testimony did not inform the jury of the outcome of 
Mr. Watkins' first trial. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.) 
However, for the reasons set forth in Part C(2), above, and in Mr. Watkins' 
Appellant's Brief (p.14 ), it ought to be clear that Officer Archuleta's testimony did, in fact, 
inform the jury of the outcome of Mr. Watkins' first trial. Accordingly, the State's third 
argument is simply irrelevant. 12 
12 As should be apparent from Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief, it Officer Archuleta's 
testimony is interpreted as not having revealed the outcome of the first case, only the 
fact that a trial occurred, Mr. Watkins cannot prevail in the present appeal. The crux of 
13 
The only relevant question is whether, assuming Officer Archuleta did reveal the 
outcome of Mr. Watkins' first trial, that disclosure rendered Mr. Watkins' unfair, such that 
a mistrial should have been declared. On this point, Mr. Watkins, the district court, 13 the 
State, 14 and the bulk of the authority 15 all seem to be in agreement in concluding that 
the trial was unfair and the mistrial should have been declared. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Watkins respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and sentence, 
and that it remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 3rd day of November, 2011. 
ERK . r: H 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
his claim is that his trial was rendered unfair through Officer Archuleta's disclosure, 
albeit implicit, of the fact that Mr. Watkins was previously found guilty of the same 
charge at his first trial. 
13 The district court specifically warned the prosecutor that any explicit mention of the 
fact that Mr. Watkins had been found guilty at the first trial, or had been sent to the 
penitentiary after the first trial, would result in a mistrial. (No. 37906 Jun. 22, 2010 Tr., 
p.109, Ls.10-13.) 
14 As noted above, it appears that the State would concede that if this Court finds that 
Officer Archuleta informed the jury of the outcome of the first trial, a mistrial would have 
been required. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.) 
15 (See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11 (compiling cases).) 
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